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I. TERMINOLOGY
This article refers to “security forces”, a category which includes
state militaries and police (“state security forces”) and peacekeepers.1
It refers to both conflict-related sexual violence (CRSV) and the more
specific category of sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). 2 SEA is not
adequately defined in any legal instrument or international case.3
“Sexual abuse” is used to refer to acts that are obviously forced or
coercive.4 “Sexual exploitation” is the term generally used for sexual
relations entered into where a veneer of consent is present, including
the categories of “transactional sex” and “sexually exploitative
relationships” listed in the United Nations (UN)’s online database of
SEA allegations against peacekeepers5 and in the UN Special
Coordinator on improving the UN’s response to SEA’s Glossary of
Terms.6 This article focuses on internally displaced person (IDP)
camps with a high presence of security forces in conflict countries
because of the prevalence of all of the abovementioned forms of SEA
in such environments. While the article continues to refer to CRSV,
rape and SEA as distinct categories of crimes, it argues that in most
circumstances, SEA will constitute rape and should be defined as such
in the UN allegations database and Glossary of Terms and for the
1. See infra Part III.
2. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on ConflictRelated Sexual Violence, ¶¶ 2, 8, UN Doc. S/2018/250 (Apr. 16, 2018) [hereinafter
2018 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV].
3. Case law from the ad hoc tribunals does not refer to ‘sexual exploitation and
abuse’ as a term and it is not included in any treaty law. The Special Coordinator on
improving the United Nations response to sexual exploitation and abuse has released
a glossary attempting to define different types of SEA, to be used as guidance. See
Task Team on the SEA Glossary for the Special Coordinator on Improving the
United Nations Response to Sexual Exploitation and Abuse, Glossary on Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse: Thematic Glossary of Current Terminology Related to
Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA) in the Context of the United Nations, ¶¶ 4-6
(Oct. 5, 2016), https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/un_glossary_
on_sea.pdf [hereinafter Glossary on SEA] (highlighting the vagueness of SEA
definitions).
4. See id. (“Actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether
by force or under unequal or coercive conditions.”).
5. See Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Table of Allegations, CONDUCT IN UN
FIELD MISSIONS, https://conduct.unmissions.org/table-of-allegations (last visited
Mar. 21, 2019).
6. See Glossary on SEA, supra note 3, ¶¶ 6, 13, 16.
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purposes of prosecution. Finally, “international crimes” is used as a
general term describing war crimes and crimes against humanity.7 A
consideration of whether SEA may constitute rape as an act of
genocide is beyond the scope of this article.

II. INTRODUCTION
Since the early 1990s, the international legal community has
recognized the devastating impact of sexual violence committed in
conflict by recognizing that rape and other sexual acts may constitute
torture, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and acts of genocide
under international law.8 Despite this progress, accountability and
access to justice for CRSV committed by security forces in conflicts
worldwide remains extremely limited.9 The historic failure of the
international community to prevent and punish CRSV is most acute in
relation to addressing sexual violations that are committed in private,
without an obviously violent, public or performative dimension.10
Historically, one of the biggest challenges for anti-sexual violence
activists has been the perception of rape as an intimate, private act,
committed outside the reach of legal regimes focused on public
action.11 Though decades of work by women’s rights activists have
7. Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court arts. 1, 5, opened for
signature July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (entered into force July 1, 2002).
8. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23/I-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 1-10
(June 12, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment (Sept. 2, 1998),
http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trialjudgements/en/980902.pdf. While for some time this focus was almost exclusively
on rape committed by combatants from one side of the conflict against women
belonging to the other, there is growing recognition that sexual violence against
victims from the same side of the conflict as the perpetrator also increases during
conflict. See Prosecutor v. Ntaganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06 OA5, Judgment,
¶¶ 1-2 (June 15, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_03920.PDF
(rejecting the argument of the accused that he could not be tried for the rape of his
own soldiers).
9. See, e.g., 2018 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, supra note 2, ¶¶
23, 61 (citing Afghanistan and Somalia as examples).
10. See Rhonda Copleon, Surfacing Gender: Re-Engraving Crimes Against
Women in Humanitarian Law, 5 HASTINGS WOMEN’S L. REV. 243, 264-65 (1994)
(discussing the public/private dichotomy of rape).
11. See, e.g., Rosalind Dixon, Rape as a Crime in International Humanitarian
Law: Where to from Here?, 13 EUR. J. INT’L L. 697, 700, 712 (2002).

506

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[34:3

increased accountability for both the domestic crime of rape and rape
as a war crime and crime against humanity, cases that prosecute rape
committed in private as an international crime are extremely rare.12
The experience of the ad hoc tribunals and jurisdictions around the
world has been that sexual violations are considered conflict-related
acts of violence only where there is some “public” dimension to their
commission:13 for example, if they are carried out as part of an attack;14
committed publicly;15 or serve a purpose that is solely related to the
conflict, such as forcing subordination, punishing the victim or
rewarding soldiers.16 Sexual violence carried out in private is often
considered opportunistic, and therefore unrelated to the conflict.17
Such crimes are rarely prosecuted, much less prosecuted as war crimes
or crimes against humanity.18
12. The author has done significant research into the existence of such cases over
the past 30 years and found evidence of prosecutions or civil cases being prepared
or brought in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro, Croatia, the
Netherlands, Norway, Colombia, Guatemala, Ecuador, Peru, Argentina,
Bangladesh, Uganda, Canada, the United States, and the United Kingdom. Each of
these cases is the result of significant civil society activism and pressure, and they
represent a small fraction of total war crimes, crimes against humanity, and genocide
cases taken.
13. See Rhonda Copleon, Surfacing Gender: Reconceptualizing Crimes Against
Women in Time of War, in MASS RAPE: THE WAR AGAINST WOMEN IN BOSNIAHERZEGOVINA 197, 205 (Alexandra Stiglmayer ed., Marion Faber trans., Univ. Neb.
Press 1994).
14. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Katanga, Case ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment, ¶¶ 1-13
(Mar. 7, 2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2015_04025.pdf (finding
rape was committed as a war crime and crime against humanity, but the linkage
element was missing and so Katanga was not convicted of rape); Prosecutor v. Dyilo,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment, ¶¶ 1-12 (Mar. 14, 2012), https://www.icccpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2012_03942.PDF.
15. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdanin, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Judgment, ¶ 115
(Sept. 1, 2004), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/brdanin/tjug/en/brd-tj040901e.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 731 (Sept. 2, 1998),
http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trialjudgements/en/980902.pdf.
16. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, Judgment, ¶ 501 (Feb.
20, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/mucic/acjug/en/cel-aj010220.pdf; Dyilo,
Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, ¶¶ 32, 892-95.
17. See Elisabeth J. Wood, Conflict-Related Sexual Violence and the Policy
Implications of Recent Research, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 457, 470-71 (2015),
https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/article/conflict-related-sexualviolence-and-policy-implications-recent.
18. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
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Cases of SEA have been treated even less seriously. While UN
documents acknowledge that rape is a form of sexual abuse, they do
not describe sexual exploitation as amounting to rape and in practice
distinguish SEA as a category from other serious crimes.19 The
contention that SEA is a form of rape and that it may constitute a war
crime or crime against humanity in certain circumstances, is
conspicuously absent from both these documents and more general
conversations within the UN and the wider international community
about how to respond to such allegations.20 The UN SecretaryGeneral’s 2017 report Special Measures for Protection from Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse: A New Approach, for example, identifies four
categories of SEA: (i) exploitative relationships; (ii) transactional sex;
(iii) sexual activities with minors; and (iv) sexual assault.21 It only
describes the last category as including rape, and makes no mention
that any of the named acts may constitute war crimes or crimes against
humanity.22
This article argues firstly that SEA committed by security forces in
a conflict environment will constitute rape under international law in
most circumstances. The context of the conflict and the unequal power
relationship between the security forces and local populations
constitutes “coercive circumstances” and/or “abuse of power” under
international criminal law, both factors negating the possibility of
consent to a sexual act under the Elements of Crime document that
accompanies the Rome Statute to the International Criminal Court
(ICC).23 Secondly, this article argues that SEA committed by security
forces during conflict will in most circumstances constitute a war
crime, and in some circumstances constitute a crime against humanity.
19. See, e.g., UN Secretary-General, Special Measures for Protection from
Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse: A New Approach, annex IV, UN Doc.
A/71/818 (Feb. 28, 2017) [hereinafter A New Approach] (making a distinction
between sexual exploitation and sexual abuse at the outset but then goes on to
classify SEA in general terms in a way that appears to exclude rape).
20. See generally id. at 2-82.
21. Id. annex IV.
22. Id.
23. The Elements of Crime document guides practitioners on interpreting the
Rome Statute, most of which has now attained the status of international customary
law. See ICC ASSEMBLY OF STATES PARTIES TO THE ROME STATUTE, ELEMENTS OF
CRIMES art. 7(1)(g)-1, UN Doc. ICC-ASP/1/3, U.N. Sales No. E.03.V.2 (2002).
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Finally, this article discusses the practical ramifications of the above
legal positions for security forces operating in IDP camps during times
of conflict. While the full list of implications are likely to be
numerous, this article focuses on this situation because it is in these
circumstances that SEA by the security forces appears to be
perpetrated most widely.24 Though a case by case analysis will always
be needed, this article concludes that SEA committed by security
forces against people in IDP camps during times of conflict will almost
always constitute rape as a war crime, and may constitute rape as a
crime against humanity in certain circumstances. Further, unless
extraordinary circumstances exist, IDPs residing in camps during a
conflict are not legally capable of consenting to sex with security
forces under international criminal law (ICL) or international
humanitarian law (IHL).

III. BACKGROUND
A. CONFLICT RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE COMMITTED BY
SECURITY FORCES
Sexual violence committed by security forces, including both state
forces and peacekeeping troops, has long been a challenge in the fight
against impunity for conflict-related sexual violence.25 A
comprehensive study published in 2014 looking at 129 conflict and
post-conflict environments and 625 armed actors in those conflicts
from the period of 1989–2009 found that sexual violence was more
frequently perpetrated by state militaries than rebel or militia groups.26
The UN Secretary-General’s 2017 Report on Conflict-Related Sexual
Violence, which describes fourteen active conflicts in 2016, names
24. Author’s experience in working in Somalia and South Sudan; see generally
Marija Obradovic, Protecting Female Refugees Against Sexual and Gender-based
Violence in Camps, U.N. U. (Nov. 9, 2015), https://unu.edu/publications/
articles/protecting-female-refugees-against-sexual-and-gender-based-violence-incamps.html.
25. See 2018 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, supra note 2, ¶¶ 21, 23,
25, 38-39, 47, 55-56 (denoting instances when security officials perpetrated sexual
violence in Cote D’Ivoire, Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Libya,
Mali, and Myamar).
26. Dara Kay Cohen & Ragnhild Nordås, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflict:
Introducing the SVAC Dataset, 1989-2009, 51 J. PEACE RES. 418, 418-19 (2014).

2019]

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE IN CONFLICT

509

state security forces as perpetrators of widespread sexual violence in
ten of those conflicts.27 Nine of the countries surveyed in the report
have active UN, African Union (AU), or hybrid UN/AU peacekeepers
present, and in 2016 and 2017, there were allegations of SEA recorded
against every one of these missions.28

B. TYPES OF CONFLICT RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE COMMITTED
BY SECURITY FORCES
Sexual violence carried out against civilians by national forces and
peacekeeping troops range from rape, abductions, and sexual slavery
(recognized in most literature as sexual violence or CRSV),29 to sexual
relationships occurring in coerced circumstances or with unequal
power dynamics and sex in exchange for money, goods, services, or
security (recognized in most literature as SEA).30 An assessment of the
allegations made against both categories of security actors in the UN
Secretary-General’s 2017 Report on Conflict Related Sexual Violence
reveals that allegations of mass rape, abductions, and largescale sexual
slavery were more likely to be alleged against national forces, while
allegations of SEA were more likely to be alleged against the
peacekeepers. 31 Anecdotal reports in Somalia, South Sudan, and
Nigeria indicate that SEA perpetrated by state security forces is also
common, though rarely reported.32 These two categories of crimes,
despite their differences, also have similarities: the vast majority are
perpetrated against vulnerable communities, with women and
children, IDPs, and members of ethnic and religious minorities being

27. U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on ConflictRelated Sexual Violence, ¶¶ 14, 16, 34-35, 46, UN Doc. S/2017/249 (Apr. 15, 2017)
[hereinafter 2017 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV].
28. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Table of Allegations, supra note 5.
29. See 2018 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, supra note 2, ¶¶ 2, 8.
30. Glossary on SEA, supra note 3, ¶¶ 4-7.
31. See 2017 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, supra note 27, ¶¶ 19,
35, 47, 61-62 (listing the number of sexual violence cases against state security
forces that the United Nations documented in 2016); Sexual Exploitation and Abuse:
Table of Allegations, supra note 5.
32. 2017 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, supra note 27, ¶¶ 55-56, 60;
Nigeria: Officials Abusing Displaced Women, Girls, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Oct. 31,
2016, 12:00 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2016/10/31/nigeria-officials-abusingdisplaced-women-girls.
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the most affected.33
This article will focus specifically on SEA perpetrated by the
security forces against people living in IDP camps. In environments
where IDP and refugee camps and settlements have a heavy presence
of police, military or peacekeepers, or exist in close proximity to
national or peacekeeping military bases, the rates of sexual violence
committed by security and peacekeeping forces appear to rise.34 In
South Sudan for example, a UN study conducted in 2016 found that
seventy percent of women residing in Protection of Civilian (POC)
camps in Juba had been raped.35 A preliminary study conducted by the
South Sudan Law Society in the same year found that the residents of
the camps named government security forces as the primary
perpetrators.36 There are numerous reports of IDP and refugee camp
residents entering into “transactional sex” or otherwise sexually
exploitative relationships with state security forces in Nigeria37 and
Northern Uganda,38 and with peacekeepers in Haiti,39 Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC),40 Somalia,41 Liberia, Sudan, and South
Sudan.42

C. ACCESS TO JUSTICE
Justice for CRSV committed by security forces is notoriously
33. Diana Therese M. Veloso, De La Salle Univ., Multiple Marginalization and
Gender-Based Violence in Post-Conflict Settings: The Experiences of IDPs in
Zamboanga City, Presentation at the 10th De La Salle University Arts Congress
(Feb. 16, 2017).
34. See 2017 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, supra note 27, ¶¶ 15,
62, 64; Cohen & Nordås, supra note 26, at 425.
35. Yasmin Sooka, Chair of the Commission on Human Rights in South Sudan,
Statement at the 26th Special Session of the U.N. Human Rights Council (Dec. 14,
2016).
36. S. SUDAN LAW SOC’Y, SEARCH FOR A NEW BEGINNING: PERCEPTIONS OF
TRUTH, JUSTICE, RECONCILIATION AND HEALING IN SOUTH SUDAN 44 (2015).
37. Nigeria: Officials Abusing Displaced Women, Girls, supra note 32.
38. SWEDISH RED CROSS, IHL AND GENDER – LESSONS LEARNED FROM A FIELD
STUDY IN UGANDA 31 (2015).
39. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Table of Allegations, supra note 5.
40. Id.
41. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, “THE POWER THESE MEN HAVE OVER US:”
SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE BY AFRICAN UNION FORCES IN SOMALIA 18
(2014) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH SOMALIA].
42. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse: Table of Allegations, supra note 5.

2019]

SEXUAL EXPLOITATION AND ABUSE IN CONFLICT

511

difficult to obtain.43 The UN Secretary-General’s 2017 report did not
find evidence of any convictions against national security forces in ten
of the fourteen conflict affected countries described.44 The Deputy
Prime Minister of Libya cited the failure of the authorities to prevent
and prosecute sexual violence committed by state forces as one of the
reasons for his resignation in January 2017.45 The 2017 UN SecretaryGeneral report recorded some prosecutions of security forces for
CRSV in Afghanistan (convictions of two border police); Colombia
(two percent conviction rate for allegations documented by the
Constitutional Court); and Sudan (three trials for CRSV, though it is
unclear whether they resulted in a conviction).46 The only country
listed that made significant progress in making largescale convictions
for sexual violence was the DRC, where the UN recorded 100
convictions of members of the state security forces in 2016, and where
twenty-six of the gravest cases of CRSV had been prioritised for
prosecution by the year’s end.47
Access to justice for sexual violations committed by peacekeepers
is often even more elusive.48 The culture of impunity surrounding SEA
committed by peacekeeping forces has gained international attention
in recent years, prompting the UN to adopt a “new approach”, in the
March 2016 report Special Measures for Protection from Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse.49 Even with the adoption of this new
approach, convictions of perpetrators remain extremely limited for
several reasons. First, despite information collected by the UN
indicating that approximately half of the UN personnel accused of
SEA are civilian staff, the Convention on the Privileges and
Immunities of the United Nations continues to give this category of
employees immunity from suit in any court.50 Second, where the
43. See 2017 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, supra note 27, ¶ 11.
44. Id.
45. Aidan Lewis, Deputy Leader of Libya’s U.N.-Backed Government Resigns,
REUTERS (Jan. 2, 2017, 2:39 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-libyasecurity-politics-idUSKBN14M13A.
46. 2017 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, supra note 27, ¶¶ 16, 27,
67.
47. Id. ¶ 35.
48. A New Approach, supra note 19, ¶¶ 8, 12.
49. Id. ¶ 13.
50. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations art. 6,
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accused are military staff, UN policy mandates that they be
investigated and then referred to the prosecution authority of their own
countries if there is sufficient evidence to support a case.51 In such
circumstances, however, troop contributing countries (TCCs) have
proven reluctant to prosecute.52 Third, the victim of the sexual
violation must report the incident to the peacekeeping unit in order to
begin the investigation process—a step many victims are reluctant to
undertake, considering they would be reporting to the same institution
that abused them in the first place.53
While the UN’s new approach does not address these challenges in
full, it does include mechanisms to follow up more effectively on
domestic prosecutions.54 The adoption of this new policy document in
2017 does not seem to have had a practical impact.55 Notably, there
have not been any convictions made against the French peacekeepers
which were accused of sexual abuse in the Central Africa Republic
(CAR), despite the international attention given to the case and the
issue of SEA by peacekeepers more generally.56 Charges in one case
have been dropped, and three investigations remain open almost three
years after the allegations were made public.57 The outcome of
investigations into SEA by peacekeepers in the UN Organization
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(MONOSCO), which received the most allegations of SEA between
June 2016 and the end of 2017, is also illustrative: of 56 allegations of

Feb. 13, 1946, 21 U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 16.
51. Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual Abuse,
supra note 19, § 5.
52. See MARIE DESCHAMPS ET AL., TAKING ACTION ON SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
AND ABUSE BY PEACEKEEPERS 25, 86 (2015).
53. Press Release, Code Blue Campaign, The UN’s Fatally Flawed ‘New
Approach’ to Sexual Abuse (Mar. 10, 2017), http://www.codebluecampaign.com/
press-releases/2017/3/10.
54. See A New Approach, supra note 19, ¶ 13.
55. See, e.g., Angelique Chrisafis & Sandra Laville, No Charges Sought Over
Abuse Claims Against French Troops in CAR, GUARDIAN (Jan. 5, 2017, 12:23 PM),
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jan/05/no-charges-sought-over-abuseclaims-against-french-troops-in-car.
56. See id.
57. Id.; Interview by author with employee of Code Blue Campaign (on file with
author).
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SEA made, only one resulted in a prison sentence of ten months.58

D. CONFLICT RELATED SEXUAL VIOLENCE BY SECURITY FORCES
AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME
While the number of cases taken against members of the security
forces for sexual violence as a domestic crime is low across conflict
countries, the number prosecuted for sexual violence as a war crime
or crime against humanity is even lower.59 The duty to investigate and
prosecute international crimes is enshrined in the Geneva
Conventions,60 the Rome Statute,61 and the Basic Principles and
Guidelines on the Right to a Remedy and Reparations for Victims of
Gross Violations of International Human Rights Law and Serious
Violations of International Humanitarian Law (Van Boven
Principles).62 These instruments do not explicitly require domestic
tribunals to prosecute such offences as international rather than
ordinary crimes.63 However, the very purpose of international criminal
and humanitarian law is to criminalize acts that shock the conscious
of humanity, rather than a specific domestic political community.64
The recognition of rape as an international crime from the 1990s
onwards was a major victory for advocates of access to justice and
accountability for sexual violence.65 It is important that domestic
58. Sexual Exploitation and Abuse Allegations in MONUSCO, CONDUCT IN UN
FIELD MISSIONS, https://conduct.unmissions.org/ (follow “Table of Allegations”
hyperlink; then select only “MONUSCO” under “Missions” and select only “2016
and 2017” under “Year”).
59. See, e.g., LaShawn R. Jefferson, In War as in Peace: Sexual Violence and
Women’s Status, in HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH WORLD REPORT 2004: HUMAN RIGHTS
AND ARMED CONFLICT 325, 338 (2004) (noting that the ICTY has “failed to meet
expectations for establishing accountability for sexual violence”).
60. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I)
art. 1, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3.
61. Rome Statute, supra note 7, pmbl.
62. G.A. Res. 60/147, annex, ¶ 1 (Mar. 21, 2006).
63. See PAUL SEILS, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, HANDBOOK ON
COMPLEMENTARITY: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ROLE OF NATIONAL COURTS AND
THE ICC IN PROSECUTING INTERNATIONAL CRIMES 14 (2016) (noting that the Rome
Statute provisions do not affect national laws and punishment).
64. See Massimo Renzo, Crimes Against Humanity and the Limits of
International Criminal Law, 31 L. & PHIL. 443, 467 (2012).
65. Background Information on Sexual Violence Used as a Tool of War, UN,
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tribunals adjudicating on offences committed in conflict environments
treat rape and other forms of CRSV with the seriousness such crimes
deserve.
According to the Coalition for the International Criminal Court,
only seventy of the world’s 195 countries have criminalized war
crimes and crimes against humanity in their domestic legislation.66
The majority of conflict-affected countries have not done so.67 Again,
the DRC stands out—in the past five years, creative interventions led
by civil society and supported by the international community have
seen numerous ground-breaking instances of sexual violence
committed by the security forces prosecuted as international crimes.68
Globally, there are also examples of rape being prosecuted as an
international crime in recent years in Colombia, Guatemala, Peru,69
Bosnia,70 Kosovo,71 Uganda,72 and the UK (prosecuting crimes
committed in Liberia).73 Altogether however, these cases represent
http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/rwanda/about/bgsexualviolence.shtml (last
visited Mar. 21, 2019).
66. Our
Story,
COALITION
FOR
THE
INT’L
CRIM.
CT.,
http://www.coalitionfortheicc.org/about/our-story (last visited Jan. 27, 2019).
67. See 2017 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, supra note 27, ¶¶ 17,
27, 50, 53, 57, 58, 67 (demonstrating that the majority of conflict affected countries
have no legal framework to deal with sexual violence crimes, and of the few that do,
only Afghanistan has incorporated the Rome Statute to make sexual violence rise to
the level of an international crime).
68. See, e.g., Diana Z. Alhindawi, They Will be Heard: The Rape Survivors of
Minova, AL JAZEERA AM. (Mar. 14, 2014, 2:59 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/
multimedia/2014/3/they-will-be-heard-therapesurvivorsofminova.html.
69. Daniela Kravetz, Promoting Domestic Accountability for Conflict Related
Sexual Violence: The Cases of Guatemala, Peru, and Colombia, 32 AM. U. INT’L L.
REV. 707, 711 (2017).
70. Bosnia: Key Lessons from War Crimes Prosecutions, HUM. RTS. WATCH
(Mar. 12, 2012, 12:35 AM), https://www.hrw.org/news/2012/03/12/bosnia-keylessons-war-crimes-prosecutions.
71. Edona Peci, Two Serbs Acquitted of War Rape in Kosovo, BALKAN INSIGHT
(Apr. 19, 2013), http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/serbs-acquitted-of-warrapes-in-kosovo.
72. Thomas Kwoyelo, TRIAL INT’L (Apr. 25, 2016), https://trialinternational.org/
latest-post/thomas-kwoyelo/.
73. Scott Campbell, Ex-wife of Former Liberian President is Refused Bail Ahead
of Her Trial for ‘Torturing Children and Plotting to Commit Rape During the Civil
War Nearly 30 Years Ago’, DAILY MAIL (Dec. 18, 2017, 3:58 PM),
https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-5192203/Ex-wife-former-Liberianpresident-refused-bail.html.
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only a handful of the cases taken to prosecute CRSV, and only a tiny
fraction of the CRSV actually committed.74
As stated above, the idea that SEA committed by peacekeeping
troops may amount to rape as a war crime or crime against humanity
is glaringly absent from the both the legal literature and global debate
surrounding this issue.75 Most sources make a distinction between
SEA and rape, despite the fact that SEA is coercive by definition,
thereby eliminating the possibility of real consent.76 The Glossary of
Terms released by the UN Special Representative of SEA not only
distinguishes between rape and other forms of SEA but states in
section 1.3 that sexual assault differs from rape in that it “may be
committed by other means than force or violence.”77 The requirement
for force or violence to be present to prove an allegation of rape
reflects an outdated understanding of sexual violence and is not
supported by current international law.78
As recognised by the Independent Review on Sexual Exploitation
and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the CAR:
If the UN and the TCCs are to rebuild the trust of victims, local civilian
populations, and the international community, deliberate, effective, and
immediate action is required. The first step is to acknowledge that sexual
violence perpetrated by peacekeeping troops is not merely a disciplinary
matter, but also a serious human rights violation and may amount to a
crime.79

The UN Secretary-General’s “new approach” report is silent on the
issue of how SEA should be categorised under ICL or IHL.80 Even
74. See Anne-Marie de Brouwer, The Importance of Understanding Sexual
Violence in Conflict for Investigation and Prosecution Purposes, 48 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 639, 640-641 (2015) (stating that although the occurrence of sexual violence in
conflict is high, perpetrators are not often prosecuted).
75. See, e.g., MARIA ERIKSSON, DEFINING RAPE: EMERGING OBLIGATIONS FOR
STATES UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW? 11 (Örebro Univ. 2010).
76. ERIKSSON, supra note 75, at 17.
77. Glossary on SEA, supra note 3, ¶ 9.
78. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 23, art. 7(1)(g)-1; Prosecutor v. Akayesu,
Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 598 (Sept. 2, 1998), http://unictr.irmct.org/
sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trial-judgements/en/980902.pdf.
79. DESCHAMPS ET AL., supra note 52, at xiii.
80. See generally A New Approach, supra note 19.
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Code Blue, a campaign by the international non-governmental
organisation (NGO) Aids Free Word dedicated to ending impunity for
sexual violence by UN peacekeeping personnel, does not argue in its
materials that such violence could constitute rape as an international
crime.81 Again, one of the only places this argument is made is in the
abovementioned Report of an Independent Review on Sexual
Exploitation and Abuse by International Peacekeeping Forces in the
CAR, which found that “the procurement of sex from children in
exchange for food or money”—the subject of the investigation—”may
constitute grave violations of international human rights, international
humanitarian law, and international criminal law.”82 While SEA
committed by peacekeeping forces is the subject of worldwide
scrutiny, SEA committed by state forces has not received the same
attention.83 It is unclear if any international policies or cases attempt
to classify SEA by state forces as rape as a crime under international
law.
Vague classifications of SEA committed by security forces in
conflict as a category separate to rape, and silence about whether it
could constitute an international crime, reflect a misapplication of the
law.84 First, it is well documented that many instances of SEA
perpetrated by the security forces in times of conflict are committed
against children.85 It is settled under ICL and IHL that any sexual act
committed against a child constitutes rape.86 Second, there are
numerous reports in conflict affected countries of police forces

81. See generally The Problem: Impunity for Sexual Exploitation and Abuse by
UN Personnel, CODE BLUE CAMPAIGN, http://www.codebluecampaign.com/theproblem (last visited Mar. 21, 2019).
82. DESCHAMPS ET AL., supra note 52, at 21.
83. See JENI WHALAN, DEALING WITH DISGRACE: ADDRESSING SEXUAL
EXPLOITATION
AND ABUSE
IN
UN
PEACEKEEPING 16-17 (2017),
https://www.ipinst.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/IPI-Rpt-Dealing-withDisgrace2.pdf (discussing the “grey area” of sexual abuse committed by non-UN
forces).
84. See ERIKSSON, supra note 75, at 11.
85. See, e.g., 2018 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, supra note 2, ¶ 38
(noting that a significant number of crimes committed by security forces in the
Democratic Republic of Congo were committed against children).
86. See NO PEACE WITHOUT JUSTICE AND UNICEF INNOCENTI RESEARCH CTR.,
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND CHILDREN 78 (2002).
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committing SEA against people in detention.87 The Elements of
Crimes of the Rome Statute recognizes detention as a form of
coercion, which eliminates the possibility that the detainee could
consent to the sexual act.88 Even before the adoption of the Rome
Statute, judges at the International Criminal Tribunals for Rwanda
(ICTR) and the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) had concluded that
detainees held in prison camps were legally unable to consent to sexual
activity with the camp guards on the basis that the situation was
inherently coercive, regardless of what they said or how they acted.89
IDP camps are distinguishable from prison camps because their
residents have significantly more freedom of movement and are less
vulnerable to sustained abuse.90 However, an argument can be made
that international jurisprudence in this area, though under-developed,
supports a finding that sexual encounters between security forces and
displaced persons in IDP camps will always be coercive, preventing
the potential for consent to be given.

IV. APPLICATION OF THE LAW: RECLASSIFYING
SEA AS RAPE AS AN INTERNATIONAL CRIME
The section below will apply ICL and IHL treaties and
jurisprudence to the question of whether SEA committed by security
forces against IDPs residing in camps during times of conflict will
constitute rape as a war crime and/or a crime against humanity under
international law. It concludes that SEA against minors will always
constitute rape and SEA against adults will almost always constitute
rape because of the inherently coercive circumstances and unequal
power relationship between the parties. In other words, the
presumption in such circumstances should be that the sexual act—
whether violent abuse or exploitative—is an act of rape, and a strong
87. See 2018 Report of the Secretary-General on CRSV, supra note 2, ¶¶ 47, 50
(noting this issue has occurred in Libya).
88. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 23, 7(1)(g)-1(2).
89. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2,
1998), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trialjudgements/en/980902.pdf.
90. See Erin Mooney, The Concept of Internal Displacement and the Case for
Internally Displaced Persons as a Category of Concern, 24 REFUGEE SURVEY Q. 1
(2005) (defining internally displaced persons as only those uprooted by conflict,
violence, or persecution).
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counter argument would need to be made to prove that the
circumstances were not coercive or that the relationship was not
unequal. In terms of whether such acts will constitute crimes against
humanity, it concludes that they will if sufficiently widespread and
committed habitually by security forces. In terms of whether they will
constitute war crimes, it concludes that they would in the vast majority
of circumstances.
Under ICL, three categories of elements of crime must be
demonstrated to prove the existence of a war crime or a crime against
humanity: (i) the specific elements of the crime (e.g., proving that the
crime is rape); (ii) the contextual elements of the crime (i.e., proving
that the crime was committed as a war crime or a crime against
humanity); and (iii) a nexus or link between the conduct of the
perpetrator and the widespread and systematic attack (in relation to
crimes against humanity) or the armed conflict (in relation to war
crimes).91 The following section outlines the specific elements of rape,
the contextual elements of war crimes and crimes against humanity,
and the nexus requirement. While the argument could also be made
that SEA may constitute sexual violence, sexual slavery, and enforced
prostitution in certain circumstances, these crimes are outside the
scope of this article.

A. SPECIFIC ELEMENTS OF RAPE
Rape is defined under the Rome Statute as penetration of any part
of the body of the victim or of the perpetrator with a sexual organ, or
of the anal or genital opening of the victim with any object or body
part, in circumstances where the penetration is committed:
•
•
•
•

by force, or by threat of force;
by coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress,
detention, psychological oppression, or abuse of power;
by taking advantage of a coercive environment;
against a person incapable of giving genuine consent.92

91. See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, GENOCIDE, WAR CRIMES, AND CRIMES
AGAINST HUMANITY: TOPICAL DIGESTS OF THE CASE LAW OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNAL
FOR THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 33-65 (2004).
92. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 23, arts. 7(1)(g)-1, 8(2)(b)(xxi).
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For SEA committed against children, allegations of which are
common,93 the most relevant and easily proved category from this list
is that the person was legally incapable of giving consent due to being
a minor.94 For SEA committed against adults, the most relevant
categories are abuse of power as a form of coercion and the existence
of a coercive environment.95
1. Abuse of Power
Within international criminal jurisprudence, circumstances in
which abuse of power has been found to exist generally coincide with
circumstances where the victim is detained or in custody.96 However,
it is clear from these cases that “abuse of power” is a broader category
than one that relates to detention alone, and includes a range of
“situations where the perpetrator is in a position of political, military
or other power over the victim.”97 In Kvočka, for example, though the
facts of the case occurred in conditions of detention, abuse of power
was found to have occurred not because the detainees were detained
per se but because of their position of vulnerability in relation to the
camp manager.98 The case of Krnojelac,99 also concerning a detention
centre, further illustrates that abuse of power may exist even where the
person involved appears to have a choice about whether to do the act
that underpins the criminal charge. In that case, the Chamber found
93. See, e.g., DESCHAMPS ET AL., supra note 52, at ii.
94. AMNESTY INT’L, RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE: HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND
STANDARDS IN THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 32 (2011) [hereinafter
AMNESTY INT’L RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE].
95. U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, SEXUAL AND GENDER-BASED
VIOLENCE AGAINST REFUGEES, RETURNEES, AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED
PERSONS: GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTION AND RESPONSE 13 (2003),
https://www.unhcr.org/3f696bcc4.html [hereinafter UNHCR GUIDELINES FOR
PREVENTION AND RESPONSE].
96. AMNESTY INT’L RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 94, at 23.
97. Id.
98. Prosecutor v. Kvočka, Case No. IT-98-30/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 548 (Intl Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 2, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kvocka/
tjug/en/kvo-tj011002e.pdf.
99. Prosecutor v Krnojelac, Case No. IT-97-25-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 226, 229 (Intl
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Sept. 17, 2003), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
krnojelac/acjug/en/krn-aj030917e.pdf.
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that a group of people had been subject to forced labour,
notwithstanding that they were given a choice whether to participate
and no threats were made against them in the case that they refused.100
It came to this determination because it was “satisfied that the
detainees worked in order to avoid being beaten or in the hope of
obtaining additional food.”101
Though this case concerned forced labour rather than rape, the facts
used to prove the abuse of power element are comparable to those
existing in SEA concerning security forces and residents of IDP camps
during times of conflict.102 While an IDP may appear to have a choice
about whether to enter into a “sexually exploitative” relationship or
“transactional sex”, it is well documented that IDPs enter into these
relationships and encounters in exchange for money, food, medicine,
security, and other benefits in extremely dangerous and difficult
environments.103 Meaningful choice and agency for an IDP tasked
with providing for his or her family in such circumstances may not
exist. The Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) Task Force on
Protection from SEA’s Standards of Conduct and the UN zero
tolerance policy both recognize the existence of an unequal power
relationship by prohibiting any sexual relations between peacekeeping
and humanitarian personnel and beneficiaries.104 The consequence of
this unequal relationship is that an IDP residing in a camp cannot
legally consent to a sexual encounter with a member of the security
forces, as any such encounter will constitute an abuse of power.105
100. Id. ¶¶ 194-95.
101. Id. ¶ 194.
102. AMNESTY INT’L RAPE AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE, supra note 94, at 6 (showing
that abuse of power occurs when there is a lack of consent); Krnojelac, Case No. IT97-25-A, ¶ 191.
103. Office of Internal Oversight Services, Investigation by the Office of Internal
Oversight Services into Allegations of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse in the United
Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, ¶ 26, UN
Doc. A/59/661 (Jan. 5, 2005) [hereinafter Investigation by the Office of Internal
Oversight Services].
104. INTER-AGENCY STANDING COMM., REPORT OF THE INTER-AGENCY
STANDING COMMITTEE TASK FORCE ON PROTECTION FROM SEXUAL EXPLOITATION
AND
ABUSE
IN
HUMANITARIAN
CRISES
8
(2002),
https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/system/files/legacy_files/IASC%20engli
sh%20POA%20and%20report.pdf.
105. UNHCR GUIDELINES FOR PREVENTION AND RESPONSE supra note 95, App.
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2. Coercive Environments
Another strong argument is that an IDP camp with a high presence
of security forces during a conflict is an inherently coercive
environment. The text of the Rome Statute on the circumstances in
which sexual penetration will constitute rape reads as follows: “[t]he
invasion was committed by force, or by threat of force or coercion,
such as that caused by fear of violence, duress, detention,
psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or
another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment.”106
“Coercion” and the existence of a “coercive environment” are clearly
two separate possible circumstances under the statute.107 The
difference between “coercion” and “coercive environments” is that the
latter does not require the perpetrator to act in a coercive manner but
instead describes a situation in which the perpetrator merely takes
advantage of an environment that already exists.108 Rule 70 of the
Rules of Procedure and Evidence of the ICC provides that consent
may not be inferred by the words or conduct of a victim in
circumstances where the perpetrator is taking advantage of such an
environment.109 Thus, even someone who appears to be consenting is
not legally able to do so.
There is no description of what constitutes a coercive environment
in the Rome Statute.110 In the landmark case of Akayesu, the Tribunal
notes that coercion can include “forms of duress which prey on fear or
desperation and coercion may be inherent in certain circumstances,
such as armed conflict or the military presence [of a hostile group].”111
Though the Akesyesu case was referring to military presence of an
opposing party to the conflict, international jurisprudence has since
developed to recognize sexual violence committed by combatants on
1.1.
106. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 23, art. 7(1)(g)-1 (emphasis added).
107. Id.
108. Id.
109. Int’l Criminal Court [ICC], Rules of Procedure and Evidence, at 24-25, ICCPIDS-LT-02-002/13_Eng (2013).
110. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 7.
111. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 688 (Sept. 2,
1998), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trialjudgements/en/980902.pdf.

522

AM. U. INT’L L. REV.

[34:3

one side of the conflict against civilians and even other combatants on
that same side as a war crime.112 The ICC Trial Chamber in the case
of Ntanganda found that “such conduct is prohibited at all times, both
in times of peace and during armed conflicts, and against all persons,
irrespective of any legal status [of the victims].”113
Taken in light of this more recent case, the ordinary meaning of the
words “coercive circumstances,” “fear and desperation,” and “military
presence” all apply easily to the context of IDPs in camps with a high
presence of security forces exchanging sexual favours for protection
and basic necessities.114 According to a policy paper released by the
ICC Office of the Prosecutor, any vagueness in the meaning of the
Rome Statute should be interpreted “in line with internationally
recognised human rights, including those relating to women’s human
rights and gender equality.”115 Such an interpretation requires
international jurists to recognize the vulnerability of women and
inherently coercive nature of this situation.116 Therefore, IDP camps in
which security forces are present in conflict situations are coercive
environments in which it is not legally possible for a displaced person
to consent to a sexual act with a member the security forces. In the
112. Gloria Gaggioli, Sexual Violence in Armed Conflicts: A Violation of
International Humanitarian Law and Human Rights Law, 96 INT’L REV. RED CROSS
503, 516 (2014), https://www.icrc.org/en/international-review/sexual-violencearmed-conflict (discussing the factors of war crimes and humanitarian law violations
as determined by the Kunarac case).
113. Prosecutor v. Ntanganda, Case No. ICC-01/04-02/06, Second Decision on
the Defense’s Challenge to the Jurisdiction of the Court in Respect of Counts 6 and
9, ¶ 52 (Jan. 4, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_00011.PDF.
114. See, e.g., Investigation by the Office of Internal Oversight Services, supra
note 103, ¶ 26 (describing the conditions that child IDPs live under in Congo and
specific instances of coercion leading to sexual exploitation that have occurred
there).
115. Int’l Criminal Court Office of the Prosecutor [ICC], Policy Paper on Sexual
and Gender-Based Crimes 16 (2014), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/otppolicy-paper-on-sexual-and-gender-based-crimes--june-2014.pdf.
116. Promoting Accountability for Conflict-Related Sexual Violence Against
Men: A Comparative Legal Analysis of International and Domestic Laws Relating
to IDP and Refugee Men in Uganda 63 (U.C. Berkley Sch. of Law Int’l Human
Rights Law Clinic & Makerere Univ. Sch. of Law Refugee Law Project, Working
Paper No. 24, 2013), https://www.law.berkeley.edu/files/Sexual_Violence_
Working_Paper_%28FINAL%29_130709.pdf (clarifying the criteria, whether
situational or inherent, that suggests that individuals are vulnerable and stating that
women are not inherently vulnerable, they are placed in situations of vulnerability).
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same way detainees cannot consent to sexual acts with prison camp
guards, IDPs should be considered unable to legally consent to sexual
acts with members of the security forced deployed in IDP camps
during conflict.

B. SEA AS RAPE AS A CRIME AGAINST HUMANITY
A crime against humanity is committed when the criminal act
constitutes an “attack” which is “widespread or systematic” and
“directed against any civilian population.”117 The Rome Statute
defines an “attack” as a “course of conduct involving the multiple
commission of acts [including rape]”.118 It is not necessary to show
that the conduct of the perpetrator was itself widespread and
systematic, but only that it was linked to such an attack.119 Further, the
conduct constituting the requisite attack may be that of people other
than the alleged perpetrator—in this case, the security forces—so long
as the specific conduct of the security forces is linked in some way to
the attack.120 This element would be proven in the context of state
security forces or peacekeeping missions against which there are
proven incidents of SEA that form part of a wider attack on the civilian
population. In this sense, both further instances of SEA and other
violations against the civilian population, such as inhuman or
degrading treatment, wilfully causing great suffering, and violence to
life, could be considered evidence of a more general attack.
The attack must be “widespread or systematic.”121 This is a
disjunctive rather than conjunctive definition: it is enough to prove
that the attack is either widespread or systematic.122 ICL jurisprudence
indicates that “widespread” refers to the number of people affected—
117. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 7(1).
118. Id. art. 7(2)(a).
119. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, Judgment, ¶
417 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 22, 2001),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/kunarac/tjug/en/kun-tj010222e.pdf.
120. Id. ¶¶ 416-20.
121. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 7(1).
122. Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgement, ¶¶ 174–75 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/kor-tj010226e.pdf; Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14T, Judgement, ¶¶ 201-02 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf.
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a figure that can be ascertained either by the number of victims or the
scale of the offence, and therefore the number of people who suffer
because of the offense.123 The number of people subjected to rape does
not have to be a significant portion of the population for it to reach the
requisite level of suffering or to be considered “widespread.”124
International criminal law has developed significantly over the last
thirty years to reach a point at which it considers rape one of the most
egregious international crimes.125 When committed against women in
camps or settlements, rape affects significantly more people than those
specifically targeted by the offence, as the majority of IDP, refugee
and asylum seeker households in most camps and settlements globally
are female-headed.126 Further, the number of people affected need not
be limited to those within the camps or settlements.127 It need only be
proven that those who are targeted in these areas are subjected to SEA
as part of a larger widespread or systematic attack.128 SEA by security
forces against IDPs will therefore, in many circumstances, fulfill the
“widespread” requirement under international law.
123. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-Tbis-R117, Sentencing Judgment,
¶ 28 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 11, 1999),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj991111e.pdf (discussing the gravity
of crimes against humanity because of their widespread effects on not only the large
number of victims, but on humanity as a whole).
124. See Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 577 (Sept.
2, 1998), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trialjudgements/en/980902.pdf.
125. Policy Paper on Sexual and Gender-Based Crimes, supra note 115, at 5.
126. See, e.g., U.N. High Comm’r for Refugees, Nigeria Protection Monitoring
Thematic Report, 1 (2018), https://data2.unhcr.org/fr/documents/download/65111
(finding that with every new arrival of IDPs, the numbers of female-headed
households are high); BROOKINGS INST., IMPROVING THE PROTECTION OF
INTERNALLY DISPLACED WOMEN: ASSESSMENT OF PROGRESS AND CHALLENGES 3
(2014), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/06/Improving-theProtection-of-Internally-Displacement-Women-October-10-2014.pdf (detailing the
effect of violence and rape on IDP women in Somalia and the larger issues with lack
of security and the stigma surrounding reporting).
127. See, e.g., Study Highlights Rape in Northern Uganda’s Largest IDP Camp,
UNICEF, https://www.unicef.org/media/media_27378.html (last visited Mar. 21,
2019) (stating that sexual violence, in this case against children, must be confronted
by a reliable system that victims can turn to).
128. See Prosecutor v. Kordic, Case No. IT-95-14/2-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 201-02 (Int’l
Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Feb. 26, 2001), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/
kordic_cerkez/tjug/en/kor-tj010226e.pdf.
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The “systematic” nature of an attack refers to the organized, nonaccidental repetition of an offence and the improbability of its random
occurrence.129 Initial trial judgments of the ICTR and ICTY found that
this required a policy or plan put in place governing the commission
of the offences.130 Later appeals judgments overturned this finding in
favour of a vaguer requirement of a “pattern of crime”—that is, “the
non-accidental repetition of similar criminal conduct on a regular
basis.”131 There is a culture of SEA associated with many security
forces, including police forces, militaries and peacekeeping
operations—meaning such acts are widely perpetrated and widely
accepted.132 In Somalia, for example, a 2014 Human Rights Watch
report, relying on both its own findings and findings from the UN
Monitoring Group for Somalia and Eritrea, alleges:
[T]he sexual exploitation by Ugandan soldiers at the AMISOM [African
Union Mission in Somalia] base camp and by Burundian soldiers at the
Burundian contingent’s camp appears routine and organized. . . . Somali
women having paid sex with soldiers have been able to obtain AMISOM
badges allowing them easy access in and out of [the bases]. . . . Some
Somali women having paid sex with soldiers have also resided in housing
on the base camp.133

In such circumstances, SEA may also fulfill the “systematic” criteria,
as it is defined under current ICL jurisprudence.134
The phrase “directed against any civilian population” contains three
requirements: (i) the attack must be “directed”; (ii) it can be directed
against “any” victims; and (iii) the victims must constitute a

129. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 94
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf.
130. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR 96-4-T, Judgment, ¶ 580 (Sept. 2,
1998), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-4/trialjudgements/en/980902.pdf.
131. Kunarac, IT-96-23& IT-96-23/1-A, ¶ 94; Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Case No.
ICTR-99-52-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 916–20 (Nov. 28, 2007), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/
unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-99-52/appeals-chamber-judgements/en/
071128.pdf.
132. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH SOMALIA, supra note 41, at 25.
133. Id.
134. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 7(1).
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“population”.135 That the attack must be directed draws parallels with
the requirement that it be purposeful and non-accidental.136 For crimes
against humanity that are proven on the basis that they are widespread,
but not systematic, this introduces and extra requirement that they
cannot have been randomly committed.137 In many instances of
security forces committing SEA in IDP camps, these criteria will be
satisfied. Whether each requirement is met must be determined on a
case by case basis. The term “any” confirms that the civilians need not
be members of an opposing party to the conflict; all civilians are
protected.138 This is important in the case of IDPs, refugees, and
asylum seekers, who are often from the same side of the conflict as,
and often ostensibly under the protection of, the peacekeepers and
national security forces.139 Finally, the term “population” reflects the
collective nature of the object of the attack.140 This too is satisfied
where numerous allegations of SEA exist against a peacekeeping or
national security force.
The Rome Statute introduces another requirement that the
widespread or systematic attack be carried out “pursuant to or in
furtherance of a state or organizational policy to commit such
attack.”141 There is debate as to whether this additional requirement is
specific only to the Rome Statute or may be a more generalized rule
of customary international law.142 This requirement is not included in
135. Id.
136. See Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and Judgment, ¶ 644
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf (emphasizing the attack is on a collective
group of victims to show they are targeted attacks).
137. Id. ¶ 645.
138. Darryl Robinson, Defining “Crimes Against Humanity” at the Rome
Conference, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 43, 51 (1999).
139. William G. O’Neill, A New Challenge for Peacekeepers: The Internally
Displaced 11 (Brookings Inst.-John Hopkins SAIS Project on Internal
Displacement, Occasional Paper, 2004).
140. Robinson, supra note 138, at 51.
141. Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 7(2)(a).
142. MATHIAS HOLVOET, THE STATE OR ORGANIZATIONAL POLICY
REQUIREMENT WITHIN THE DEFINITION OF CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY IN THE
ROME STATUTE: AN APPRAISAL OF THE EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE AND THE
IMPLEMENTATION PRACTICE BY ICC STATES PARTIES 4-5 (2013),
http://www.internationalcrimesdatabase.org/upload/documents/20131111t105507icd%20brief%20%202%20-%20holvoet.pdf.
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the statutes of the ICTR, ICTY, or the Special Court of Sierra Leone.143
The Appeals Chamber in Kunarac judgment found that the existence
of a state policy was not necessary to prove a crime against
humanity.144 The ICTR followed the ICTY’s jurisprudence.145
However, the ICC in finding Katanga146 and Bemba guilty of crimes
against humanity, pursuant to the Rome Statute, found that a state or
organizational policy to commit such crimes is a contextual element
of crimes against humanity. 147
In regards to the development of international humanitarian law
within national courts, research undertaken by the International
Crimes Database indicates that “[s]tates that have incorporated the
[Rome] Statute crimes by reference [to the statute], have adopted the
policy requirement, but those that have created their own offences
have not.”148 For example, the Canadian and French courts have relied
on the definition of crimes against humanity adopted by the ICC, while
in the Netherlands the courts found an individual guilty of crimes
against humanity without requiring policy or state action as an
essential element.149 The relevance of the “state or organizational
policy requirement” may therefore depend largely on the applicable
143. International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Amended
Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 6 (Sept.
2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09_en.pdf;
S.C. Res. 955, annex, art. 3 (Nov. 8, 1994); Statute for the Special Court of Sierra
Leone art. 2, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 137 (containing the text of the Statute for
the Special Court of Sierra Leone).
144. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 98
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf.
145. ICTR adopted the Kunarac view that a policy or state actions are not
necessary to establish crimes against humanity were committed. See Gacumbitsi v.
Prosecutor, Case. No. ICTR-2001-64-A, Judgment, ¶ 84 (July 7, 2006),
http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-01-64/appealschamber-judgements/en/060707.pdf; Semanza v. Prosecutor, Case. No. ICTR-9720-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 360 (May 15, 2003), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/
unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-97-20/trial-judgements/en/030515.pdf.
146. Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07, Judgment, ¶ 1114 (Mar. 7, 2014),
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2015_04025.PDF.
147. Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, ¶ 690 (Mar. 21,
2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2016_02238.pdf.
148. HOLVOET, supra note 142, at 11.
149. Charles Chernor Jalloh, What Makes a Crime Against Humanity a Crime
Against Humanity, 28 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 381, 403-05 (2013).
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domestic law. However, it is strongly arguable in countries which do
not simply domesticate the Rome Statute that SEA committed by
peacekeepers may constitute a crime against humanity in specific
circumstances.

C. SEA AS RAPE AS A WAR CRIME
The Rome Statute defines war crimes as including both “serious
violations of the laws and customs applicable in international armed
conflict” and “serious violations of the laws and customs applicable in
an armed conflict not of an international character.”150 Crimes
amounting to war crimes are enumerated in the Statute, as well as the
Statutes of the ICTR, ICTY, Special Court of Sierra Leone, the
Geneva Conventions, and international customary law, and include
rape and sexual violence.151 To amount to a war crime, the conduct
must have a sufficient nexus with the armed conflict.152
For international armed conflicts, the first common article of the
Geneva Conventions describes the nexus by requiring that the criminal
conduct “[takes] place in the context of and [is] associated with an
international armed conflict”, and “the perpetrator [is] aware of factual
circumstances that established the existence of an armed conflict.”153
The nexus requirement in relation to non-international armed conflicts
has been further defined by the ad hoc tribunals and the ICC.154 In the
Tadić judgment, for example, the ICTY Trial Chamber held that “a
sufficient nexus must be established between the alleged offence and
the armed conflict which gives rise to the applicability of international
150. Rome Statute, supra note 7, arts. 8(2)(b)-(e).
151. Id. at arts. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi); S.C. Res. 955, supra note 143, art 3(g);
Amended Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
supra note 143, at 6; Report of the Secretary-General on the Establishment of a
Special Court for Sierra Leone, supra note 143, art. 2(g).
152. ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 23, art. 8.
153. See, e.g., id. at art. 8(2)(a)(i) (describing the elements of wilful killing which
is a war crime).
154. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Bemba Gombo, ICC-01/05-01/08, Judgment, ¶ 14244 (Mar. 21, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/courtrecords/cr2016_02238.pdf;
Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, ICTR-96-3-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶¶ 104–05 (Dec. 6,
1999), http://unictr.irmct.org/sites/unictr.org/files/case-documents/ictr-96-3/trialjudgements/en/991206.pdf; Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-T, Opinion and
Judgment, ¶ 572 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997),
http://www.icty.org/x/cases/tadic/tjug/en/tad-tsj70507JT2-e.pdf.
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humanitarian law.”155
Prima facie, this test would almost always be satisfied where
security forces commit SEA against IDP populations. The large
number of people residing in camps or settlements, the peacekeepers
and the heavy military presence are all factors that would not be
present if not for the armed conflict. The jurisprudence supports the
contention that the offence need only be related to the armed conflict,
rather than caused by it: according to Kunarac, “the armed conflict
need not have been causal to the commission of the crime, but the
existence of an armed conflict must, at a minimum, have played a
substantial part in the perpetrator’s ability to commit it, his decision to
commit it, the manner in which it was committed or the purpose for
which it was committed.”156 It is not necessary that the crimes be
committed in the specific geographical area that the armed conflict is
taking place.157 The nexus requirement will be satisfied where “the
alleged crimes were closely related to the hostilities occurring in other
parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict.”158 SEA
by security forces against IDPs is therefore even likely to be a war
crime where the IDP camp is geographically removed from the
fighting, so long as the existence of the camp is tied to the conflict.
The jurisprudence also lists relevant factors as including “the fact
that the perpetrator is a combatant; the fact that the victim is a noncombatant; . . . and the fact that the crime is committed as a part of or
in the context of the perpetrator’s official duties.”159 In circumstances
in which the alleged perpetrators are from a military or peacekeeping
force and are committing SEA against IDPs in camps, each of these
factors are present.
It is difficult to imagine circumstances in which SEA perpetrated
by state security forces or peacekeepers against IDPs in camps would
155. Tadić, IT-94-1-T, ¶ 572.
156. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case Nos. IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, Judgment, ¶ 58
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia June 12, 2002), http://www.icty.org/x/
cases/kunarac/acjug/en/kun-aj020612e.pdf.
157. Id. ¶ 57.
158. Prosecutor v. Blaškić, Case No. IT-95-14-T, Judgement, ¶ 69 (Int’l Crim.
Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Mar. 3, 2000), http://www.icty.org/x/cases/blaskic/
tjug/en/bla-tj000303e.pdf.
159. Kunarac, IT-96-23 & IT-96-23/1-A, ¶ 59.
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not be considered a war crime, unless it could be proven that the
circumstances in which the crime was committed were entirely
unrelated to the conflict.160 If SEA is widespread, proving that it
constitutes a crime against humanity should also be relatively easy.161
If it is not widespread, proving that it is committed systematically may
be more difficult, particularly if a state policy is required, but would
still be possible in many circumstances.162

V. IMPACT OF RECLASSIFICATION
If there is international recognition that SEA committed by the
security forces may constitute rape as a war crime or a crime against
humanity, this could have an important impact on the way that national
and international actors respond to allegations of such violations.163
This impact may be measured in relation to three groups of
stakeholders: (i) the individual perpetrators; (ii) the states responsible
for national security forces; and (iii) the international organizations
responsible for peacekeeping troops.164
At the level of individual perpetrators, research indicates that the
potential of being prosecuted in an international court has a deterrent
effect, in particular for non-heads of state, who are less likely to
160. Cf. Tadić, IT-94-1-T, ¶¶ 572-73 (stating that international humanitarian law
is applicable when alleged crimes are “closely related to the hostilities occurring in
other parts of the territories controlled by the parties to the conflict”).
161. See Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 7.
162. See id.
163. Compare ELEMENTS OF CRIMES, supra note 23, arts. 7(1)(g)-6, 8(2)(b)(xxii)6 (requiring that a perpetrator, both for the crime against humanity of sexual violence
and the war crime of sexual violence, to “engage in an act of a sexual nature by force,
or by threat of force or coercion, such as that caused by fear of violence, duress,
detention, psychological oppression or abuse of power, against such person or
persons or another person, or by taking advantage of a coercive environment or such
person’s or persons’ incapacity to give genuine consent”), with U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Special Measures for Protection from Sexual Exploitation and Sexual
Abuse, ¶ 1, UN Doc. A/60/861 (May 24, 2006) (defining SEA as “any actual or
attempted abuse of a position of vulnerability, differential power, or trust, for sexual
purposes” and “actual or threatened physical intrusion of a sexual nature, whether
by force or under unequal or coercive conditions”).
164. THE COMMONWEALTH, INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE: AN INTRODUCTORY HANDBOOK, 53 (2014)
[hereinafter IHL & ICJ HANDBOOK] (explaining that both individuals and states can
be held responsible if they commit violations).
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benefit from immunity or the full protection of the state apparatus.165
In the context of the ICC, studies have shown both that as the state is
threatened with ICC prosecution, violence against civilians decreases,
and that once an ICC investigation starts, domestic prosecutions of
lower-level officials are more likely.166 Research has also indicated
that the threat of prosecution for an international crime in domestic
courts can have a powerful deterrent effect.167
Fear of legal action may also have behavior-changing effect on
national governments. While international criminal law bestows
individual criminal responsibility for war crimes, international
humanitarian law places legal responsibility on the state.168
Recognizing that SEA may constitute rape as a war crime increases
the vulnerability of states to lawsuits claiming breaches of IHL.169
Further, research indicates that even without cases being taken,
developments in international law have in many countries had a
norms-changing effect over time.170 International recognition that SEA
in conflict constitutes rape as a war crime in most circumstances and
a crime against humanity in some is likely to prompt many countries
to increase the attention given to this subject in police and military
training and capacity building.171
165. See generally Hyeran Jo & Beth A. Simmons, Can the International
Criminal Court Deter Atrocity?, 70 INT’L ORG. 443, 460 (2016); Geoff Dancy &
Florencia Montal, Unintended Positive Complementarity: Why International
Criminal Court Investigations May Increase Domestic Human Rights Prosecutions,
111 AM. J. INT’L L. 689, 716 (2017) (discussing the potential impact on
neighbouring countries of ICC investigations on domestic prosecutions).
166. Dancy & Montal, supra note 165, at 715.
167. William W. Burke-White, Proactive Complementarity: The International
Criminal Court and National Courts in the Rome System of International Justice, 49
HARV. INT’L L.J. 53, 74 (2008).
168. IHL & ICJ HANDBOOK, supra note 164, at 54.
169. Cf. Jo & Simmons, supra note 165, at 452 (explaining how state ratification
of the Rome Statute makes potential perpetrators of war crimes vulnerable to
prosecution, which, possibly by extension, could also lead to state responsibility if
SEA was accepted as a crime under IHL).
170. Cf. LOUIS HENKIN, HOW NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY, 333
(2d ed. 1979) (explaining how norms in international law have shifted over time due
to state practice and that there is no reason to say future developments could
incorporate SEA into customary IHL).
171. Cf. David Luban, A Theory of Crimes Against Humanity, 29 YALE J. INT’L
L. 85, 129 (2004) (discussing how changes in law enforcement guidelines cannot be
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Finally, at the level of the UN, reclassifying SEA as rape as a war
crime or crime against humanity would provide some much-needed
impetus for overhauling the current system of responding to such
offences—one that goes far beyond the “new approach” outlined in
the Secretary-General’s 2017 report.172 Retaining the immunity from
suit for civilian perpetrators, for example, may become considered
unacceptable if these crimes were recognized as war crimes and
crimes against humanity. This re-classification would also have an
impact on the way SEA by military perpetrators is investigated. At
present, such allegations are investigated internally by the UN and
referred to state prosecutors where considered necessary, whereas
allegations of more explicit, violent, or public CRSV is often the
subject of investigation by independent experts.173 A recognition that
SEA is also CRSV and may also be an international crime would be a
strong basis for an argument to send any independent investigators any
time such allegations are made. International pressure to ensure such
investigations lead to prosecutions and convictions in practice would
also be likely to increase.

VI. CONCLUSION
SEA committed by security forces in conflict contributes to global
insecurity. A community cannot be safe or stable if those charged with
its protection are engaged in sexual violence against women, children
and other populations vulnerable to such abuse. While there is
consensus in the international legal community that public, explicit
forms of sexual violence must be treated and prosecuted as grave
international crimes, there is little recognition that the same arguments
can be applied to acts of SEA.174 The insistence on categorizing SEA
as a crime other than rape, and the silence on the issue of whether it
constitutes an international crime, is not supported by international
fully implemented without adequate training).
172. See generally A New Approach, supra note 19 (outlining the UN’s already
outdated “new” approach to SEA accountability).
173. Id. ¶ 26.
174. See, e.g., Rome Statute, supra note 7, art. 8(2)(b)(xxii), 8(2)(e)(vi)
(explaining these forms of abuse, at least when they amount to rape, sexual slavery,
etc., are considered crimes against humanity and war crimes, without any explicit
mention of SEA).
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law and jurisprudence.175 Strong arguments can be made on the basis
of case law from the ad hoc tribunals and the international customary
law codified by the Rome Statute that SEA perpetrated by security
forces during time of conflict constitutes rape as a war crime in most
circumstances and rape as a crime against humanity in some. The
practical consequence of this legal position for security forces
operating in IDP camps in conflict environments is that entering into
exploitative or transaction sexual relationship with camp residents will
almost always constitute a serious international crime. Recognition of
this legal argument at the international level may have a powerful
impact on the way SEA is responded to and prosecuted, and a
transformative effect on the lives of displaced people living under
constant threat of sexual violence.

175. LEGAL ACTION WORLDWIDE, ANNUAL REPORT 2017 6 (2017).

